


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
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OCTOBER 1, 1964

Russian Missile Output Again Falls Short of U.S. Estimates

By PHIL GOULDING
Plain Dealer Bureau

WASHINGTON — Newest American intelligence estimates of current Soviet missile strength indicate that Russia has once again failed to produce as anticipated.

U.S. officials now believe that the Communists have approximately 180 long-range ballistic weapons, give or take a few.

This is substantially short of the figure predicted for the Soviet Union as recently as early this year.

Official American estimates then ranged from 200 to 250 for June or July.

CONSISTENTLY over the last decade, U.S. intelligence experts have overestimated Communist production of strategic weapons systems—the big bombers and long-range missiles able to reach the United States.

Defense officials point out that all intelligence predictions tend to be on the high side, partly for "insurance" reasons.

But in estimates of Soviet

strategic strength, the intelligence community has not been close. This is not a partisan statement; it applies equally to estimates under all recent administrations.

DISPASSIONATE Pentagon sources noted last night:

The intelligence "community" was wrong on the bomber gap, which never developed. It was wrong on the missile gap, which never developed.

Five years ago, authorities were speculating that the Russians would have an arsenal of some 300 to 600 ICBM's by the middle of last year.

Three years ago, some predictions were still running as high as 500 missiles by mid-1963.

The actual count a year ago, officials said, was much closer to 100.

THE UNITED STATES today has 120 liquid-fueled Atlas missiles, 108 Titans and more than 600 solid-fueled Minutemen—plus 256 Polaris weapons capable of being launched by nuclear-powered submarines lying beneath the sea.

American sources also question the dependability of the Soviet weapons—just as the dependability of American liquid-fueled missiles is questioned.

For years, United States intelligence people have been expecting the Russians to start producing the superior solid-fueled missiles, which cannot handle as big a warhead but are much more dependable, easier to maintain, quicker to fire and cheaper to make.

THE RUSSIANS are believed to have about 150 ballistic missiles which can be launched from submarines—but the range is only a very few hundred miles, the submarines are not nuclear powered and they must fire from the surface.

Nor do American planners

see a vast threat from the Soviet bomber fleet. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara has said that Russia could place only about 100 heavy bombers over the United States (on two-way missions), plus another 150 medium bombers over Canada and the northwest portion of the United States.

There are some 1,100 bombers in America's Strategic Air Command.

"The plain fact is," said one top Pentagon official last night, "that the Russians just don't realize that they are in an arms race."

OCT 1 1964

Missile Output Of Reds Falls Under Estimate

Intelligence Says
Fewer Than 200
Are Ready to Fire

By RICHARD FRYKLUND

Star Staff Writer

New intelligence figures indicate that the Soviet Union once again has failed to build the number of ICBMs predicted in the annual American estimates.

As a consequence, officials say, American missile plans probably will be adjusted downwards.

Since the wild days of the "missile gap" predictions, the Soviet Union never has built the force expected.

The last annual American estimate, passed on to Congress in January, said (the exact figures are not used here for security reasons) that the Russians would have 200 to 250 ICBMs ready to fire by July. The January, 1963, estimate for July of this year had been even higher.

Today, three months beyond July 1, the Russians are considered to have fewer than 200 ready ICBMs.

Estimates Cut

All of the existing long-range estimates for future Russian ICBM deployment are now being cut.

The Air Force, as usual in the annual inter-agency discussions, is resisting the change. The Army, as usual, wants the estimate reduced further than other intelligence agencies are willing to go.

The new long-range predictions, which will be completed toward the end of this year, are expected, as usual, to take a middle position and concede the Russians several hundred—but well under a thousand ICBMs by 1970.

The Soviet Union also is building a submarine-launched missile force (smaller than its ICBM force), but again the build-up is lagging behind American intelligence estimates.

The missile lag, combined with the Communist long-range bomber

force, makes the Soviet Union a far less formidable adversary than has been predicted during the last five years.

But the United States in the last five years has exceeded its old plans.

As a result, the Russians are so far behind they apparently are not even racing.

The Russian bomber force is so small that intelligence officers doubt that 100 bombers could make it to the United States and hope to return. The force is so poorly trained and equipped that the U. S.

Strategic Air Command would not consider any of the planes or crews "operational."

Forces Vulnerable

SAC has found that a bomber crew that does not fly frequent practice missions all over the world cannot be counted on to find a war-time target in an unfamiliar country half a globe away. Russian crews make few flights, all of them within the Soviet Union.

The Russian bomber and missile forces are much more vulnerable than the United States'.

The Russian bombers are not on alert but more than half of SAC's are. Protection given Communist missiles is primitive and the missiles themselves are unreliable by American standards.

If the Soviet Union had a large force, even though vulnerable, it would be assumed in American intelligence estimates that the Kremlin was contemplating a sudden first strike. A small vulnerable force, however, makes little sense—unless:

The Russian economy simply may not be able to buy a better force.

Or the Russian bombers and missiles may be designed only for threats, not use.

The United States has a different approach. It is committed to defend Europe with its long-range nuclear weapons. It must, therefore, have enough weapons to insure the destruction of the Communist force even in the

United States long-range bombers now total 1,100, ICBMs 878 and sub-based ballistic missiles 272.

The American buildup is continuing, but the new estimates of Russian forces may slow it down.

A new defense budget is being worked on now in the Pentagon. It will go to Congress along with the intelligence estimates in January.

As part of the budget process, five-year plans for future strategic weapons are being reviewed.

The intelligence estimates make it sure that the planned Minuteman ICBM program—now tentatively set at 1,200—will be reviewed closely. The program was cut a year ago from 1,300 when the Russians failed to build ICBMs as previously predicted.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara also may feel more secure in his plans to scrap the older, poorly protected Atlas and Titan

AUG 18 1964

Approved For Release 2003/05/05 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000600120025-8

Text of McNamara's Statement to Platform Group

Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 17—
Following is the text of the
statement by Secretary of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara be-
fore the Democratic Platform
Committee today:

My purpose this afternoon
is to review the defense poli-
cies of this Administration,
to report to you and the
American people on the ful-
fillment of the pledges made
by the Kennedy-Johnson Ad-
ministration in 1960, and to
recommend our defense poli-
cies for the coming years.

The defense establishment
we found in 1961 was based
on a strategy of massive
nuclear retaliation as the an-
swer to all military and po-
litical aggression. We, how-
ever, were convinced that our
enemies would never find
credible a strategy which
even the American people did
not believe.

We believed in a strategy
of controlled flexible response,
where the military force of
the United States would be-
come a finely tuned instru-
ment of national policy,
versatile enough to meet with
appropriate force the full
spectrum of possible threats
to our national security from
guerrilla subversion to all-
out nuclear war.

The Defense Department we
found in 1961 was one in
which each military service
plans. We found the Army re-
lying on air-lift which the
Air Force was unable to pro-
vide. We found the Army en-
visioning a long war stock-
piling supplies for as long as
war, has supplies for only a
few days.

We found a weapons inven-
tory completely lacking in
certain major elements re-
quired for combat readiness,
but which also contained 270
per cent of the necessary 105
mm towed howitzers, and 290
per cent of the necessary 4.2
inch mortars. We believed in
balanced, integrated, mili-
tary forces equipped to re-
spond with a level of power
appropriate to the type of
aggression mounted against
us.

In 1961, we found military
strategy to be the stepchild
of a predetermined budget. A
financial ceiling was placed
on national security and funds
were allocated not on the
basis of military require-
ments, but according to the
dictates of an arbitrary fiscal
policy.

While we believed that our
defense forces should be pro-
cured and operated at the
lowest possible cost, we were
convinced that only the safety
of the country should deter-
mine the forces to be as-
sembled.

Force Found Vulnerable

The strategic nuclear force
we found in the defense de-
partment was vulnerable to
surprise missile attack. The
nuclear force we found
was weak in combat-ready di-
visions, weak in airlift capa-
bility, weak in tactical air
support.

The counterinsurgency
forces were, for all practical
purposes, nonexistent. We be-
lieved that the United States
must be supreme in all types
of military force to meet all
types of aggression across the
entire spectrum of modern-
day conflict.

That is why, in 1960, Presi-
dents Kennedy and Johnson
pledged:

"To recast our military
capability in order to provide
forces and weapons of a
diversity, balance and mobil-
ity sufficient in quantity and
quality to deter both limited
and general aggression."

"To create 'deterrent mili-
tary power such that the
Soviet and Chinese leaders
will have no doubt that an
attack on the United States
would surely be followed by
their own destruction.'"

"To pursue 'continuous
modernization of our forces
through intensified research
and development, including
essential programs slowed
down, terminated, suspended,
or neglected for lack of bud-
getary support.'"

When I became Secretary
of Defense in January, 1961,

we instructions which Presi-
dent Johnson has strongly re-
emphasized:

"First, develop the mili-
tary structure necessary for
a solid foundation for our
foreign policy, and do this
without regard to arbitrary
or predetermined budget ceil-
ings.

"Second, having deter-
mined that force structure,
procure and operate it at the
lowest possible cost.

In the first State of the
Union Message to the Con-
gress, President Kennedy
said:

"I have instructed the Sec-
retary of Defense to re-
appraise our entire defense
strategy—our ability to ful-
fill our commitments—the ef-
fectiveness, vulnerability, and
dispersal of our strategic
bases, forces and warning
systems—the efficiency and
economy of our operation and
organization—the elimination
of obsolete bases and installa-
tions -- and the adequacy,
modernization and mobility of
our present conventional and
nuclear forces and weapons
systems in the light of the
present and future dangers."

Keeping of Pledges

Under the direction of Presi-
dents Kennedy and Johnson,
with the cooperation of the
Congress, with the support of
the leaders of both political
parties, aided by dedicated
and able assistants in and
out of uniform, and with the
aid of the American peo-

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ple, we have been able to keep these pledges.

We have vastly increased our strategic nuclear and conventional strength. Since January 1961, we have attained:

QA 150 per cent increase in the number of nuclear warheads and a 200 per cent increase in total megatonnage in our strategic alert forces.

QA 60 per cent increase in the tactical nuclear force in Western Europe.

QA 45 per cent increase in the number of combat-ready Army divisions.

QA 44 per cent increase in the number of tactical fighter squadrons.

QA 75 per cent increase in aircraft capability.

QA 100 per cent increase in ship construction to modernize our fleet.

QA 800 per cent increase in the special forces trained for counterinsurgency.

To appreciate the full extent of this force, we must contrast it to that of our principal adversary. By such a test, our strategic superiority is uncontested.

Our strategic alert forces now have 1,100 bombers, including 550 on 15-minute alert, equipped with decoy missiles and other penetration aids to assure that they will reach their targets.

The Soviet Union could, with difficulty, place over this country on two-way missions slightly more than 100 heavy bombers, plus 150 medium bombers capable of striking only Canada and the northwestern corner of the United States.

We have no more than 800 fully armed, dependable ICBMs deployed on launchers, almost all in hardened and dispersed silos. The Soviet Union has fewer than one-fourth this number, and fewer still in hardened silos.

Our Navy now has 256 Polaris missiles deployed in 16 submarines; 25 more Polaris submarines are under construction. The Soviet Union's submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet is, by comparison, small and ineffective.

Each of our Polaris missiles is carried in a nuclear-powered submarine—but only a small percentage of Soviet ballistic missile submarines have nuclear power.

Each of our Polaris missiles can be launched from beneath the surface. The Soviet's have no such operational missile.

Each of our Polaris missiles has a range of 1,500 miles or more. The range of Soviet submarine-launched missiles is less than one-third as much.

Products Of Efforts

The power of these forces will soon be further increased by the addition of the new Polaris A-3 missile and the new Minuteman II.

The Minuteman II is as great an improvement of the Minuteman I as the B-52 is over the B-47. It will be as effective

against the best-protected military targets as its predecessor.

These, and other new weapons developments, are products of our continuing efforts to keep the pledge we made in 1960 and to make certain, in President Johnson's words, "that the United States is, and will remain, first in the use of science and technology for the protection of its people."

We have, in fact, increased by 50 per cent expenditures for military research and development over the level prevailing during the last four years of the previous Administration. We have initiated 268 weapons research projects, including 77 costing \$10 million or more each.

I would like to mention just a few of the new projects and new weapons systems initiated or carried to completion during this Administration:

QA The SR-71, a long-range, manned, supersonic strategic military reconnaissance aircraft, which employs the most advanced observation equipment in the world and flies at over 2,000 miles per hour and an altitude of over 80,000 feet.

QA The new Nike-X, which will give us the option to deploy — if the national security requires it — the most advanced anti-ballistic missile yet conceived by any nation.

QA The new A-7-A aircraft, which will give the Navy superior attack capability at more than double the range of the A-4-E that it will replace.

QA The Ex-10, a heavy, new type of torpedo for use against deep-diving, fast, nuclear-submarines.

QA The new main battle tank, which will give our ground forces armor superiority throughout the 1970's.

QA The revolutionary variable sweep-winged F-111 fighter-bomber, a supersonic aircraft which has double the range and several times the payload of any previous fighter-bomber.

Let me assure you that our strategic forces are and will remain in the 1960's and the seventies, sufficient to insure the destruction of both the Soviet Union and Communist China, under the worst imaginable circumstances accompanying the outbreak of war. There should be no doubt that of this in the mind of any American. There is none in the minds of our enemies.

But nuclear power alone is not enough. Such power was not usable against the Soviets when they blockaded our friends in West Berlin.

Such power was not usable against Communist guerrillas in Greece in 1947. It was not usable in Malaya in 1948. It was not usable against Communist guerrillas in the Philip-

ines in 1950. It was not usable to protect our destroyers in the Taiwan Strait in 1954.

And such power is not usable against the Viet Cong guerrillas who have infiltrated South Vietnam.

Lower End of Spectrum

The effectiveness of the strategic nuclear deterrent we have assembled against our enemies has driven them to acts of political and military aggression at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict.

The Communists now seek to test our capacity, our patience and our will to resist at the lower end of the spectrum by crawling under the nuclear defenses of the free world.

The threat that Castro presents to Latin America and the challenge before us today in South Vietnam lies not in nuclear war, but in the twilight zone of guerrilla terrorism and subversion.

To deal with this form of political and military aggression and similar acts of violence which are less than all-out war, since 1961:

QA We have increased the regular strength of the Army by 100,000 men, and the number of combat-ready divisions from 11 to 16.

QA We have raised the number of tactical fighter squadrons from 5 to 78.

We have trained over 100,000 officers in counterinsurgency skills necessary to fight guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare.

QA We have put into production the new C-141 Starlifter, which will, by 1968, increase our airlift by 400 per cent over what we had in 1961.

What I have just described is an aggregation of force without parallel in human history. As President Johnson has said, we, as well as our adversaries, must stand in awe before the power our craft has created and our wisdom must labor to control."

To create and maintain such a force has required the investment of \$30 billion more for the fiscal years 1962-1965 than would have been spent had we continued at the level of the last defense budget of the previous Administration.

To create and maintain such a force requires natural resources, scientific ingenuity, industrial complexes, and millions of Americans dedicated to the security of this country and the free world.

To harness this wide array of human and material resources, and to form them into usable power requires an exceedingly precise degree of control. The engine of defense must be so harnessed that its vast power may be unleashed to the precise degree required by whatever threat we face.

In January, 1961, we intro-

duced an integrated cycle of planning that integrates, on a continuing five-year basis, our total military requirements. Our national strategy, the military force structure, the war plans and the defense budget are now all related one to another.

Today, our entire defense effort is planned as a unified whole. This system eliminates wasteful duplication. It weeds out programs which have lost their original promise, freeing resources for more profitable application in other areas.

Through it, we have been able to provide and maintain a balanced, flexible force capable of meeting any challenge, at the lowest possible cost.

The determination to maintain the necessary military force for our national security without regard to arbitrary budgets does not mean that we must discard either common sense or prudent management. True economy is not really the product of arbitrary budget ceilings. It never has been. True economy in building the nation's defense consists in:

QA Buying only what we need.

QA Buying at the lowest sound price.

QA And reducing operating costs.

In the absence of these precepts, our reconstituted defense force would have cost many billions of dollars more than the \$50 billion that we have been required to invest each year. By following these precepts, we have:

QA Saved \$2.5 billion in fiscal year 1964 alone; \$1 billion more than our original goal.

QA Set a goal of future savings of \$4.6 billion each year, every year, beginning in fiscal year 1968.

QA Reduced annual operating costs by \$568 million by terminating operations at obsolete and surplus military bases.

Turned back to the private sector of our economy 1,100 square miles of real estate which is now tax-producing instead of tax-consuming.

We could not have instituted the integrated system by which we have increased our strength without the wholehearted cooperation and support of our men and women in uniform.

Neither this system — nor any system — will ever be a substitute for sound military judgment. Under this Administration, as never before, professional military judgment from all four services has been a critical factor in the planning of our defense strategy.

As General Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in 1963:

Continued

"The voice of the American soldier is entitled to a serious hearing in our national councils — and I am happy to report that today he receives that hearing."

Judgment and Techniques

Mr. Chairman, as you and I know, it is only by combining the best military judgment in the world and the most advanced scientific and analytical techniques, that we have been able to create and control the balanced, flexible forces now at our disposal.

Development of the greatest military power in human history — with a capability to respond to every level of aggression across the entire spectrum of conflict — is beyond question the most significant achievement in the defense establishment during our years in office.

Having placed this vast power at the disposal of the President of the United States, we have also given him the means to control it.

For, his is an awesome responsibility. A full-scale nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, lasting less than one hour, would kill almost 100 million Americans — the equivalent of over 300 World War II's. There would be little comfort in knowing that over 100 million Russians would also be killed.

The awesome responsibility to unleash such force, I believe, can rest only on the highest elected official in this country—the President of the United States.

This is why we have devoted such talent and energy to bring nuclear weapons under the actual, as well as theoretical, control of the President.

Our best scientists have created the most secure and the most dependable communications and control system conceived by man. Every step from the first command to the final firing is participated in by two or more people following intricate and highly secret procedures. Each of these procedures is personally approved by the President himself.

We in defense will spare no energy to make certain that the President of the United States—and he alone—has complete control over the dispatch of our nuclear weapons.

I consider the provisions of this control to the President my most solemn obligation as Secretary of Defense.

I believe this has also been the view of every United States President, every Secretary of State and every Secretary of Defense in the nuclear era. As President Johnson has said:

"I believe that the final responsibility for all decisions on nuclear weapons must rest with the civilian head of this Government, the President of the United States. And I believe that is the way the American people want it."

And this is the first pledge that I would recommend we make to the American people in 1964.